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Merchant Restraints in Ohio v. American Express—
Why the Supreme Court Got It Wrong 
Trent Earl 
fK==fåíêçÇìÅíáçå=
A forgotten wallet at dinner led to a revolution that influenced 
the way the world exchanges goods.1 Nearly seventy years ago, Frank 
McNamara, after forgetting his wallet while eating at a restaurant in 
Manhattan, conceived the first credit card—the Diner’s Club Card.2 
In just a few short decades, payment cards like the Diner’s Club Card 
evolved from nice novelty items to fundamental purchasing tools for 
the majority of consumers. Today, over 70% of Americans have at 
least one credit card in their wallets, and a majority of those carry 
more than one card.3 The more recent advent of mobile payment sys-
tems, such as Apple Pay, has given consumers another alternative 
payment method. As more merchants and credit card conglomerates 
such as American Express (Amex), Visa, Mastercard, and Discover ac-
cept mobile payments, cashless payments have become increasingly 
prolific. It is no wonder that most Americans foresee that cash will 
become an archaic tool of the past.4 However, this relatively swift ex-
pansion of the payment card market has been coupled with “some of 
the most expensive and contested public and private antitrust litiga-
tion of the past quarter of a century.”5 
Recent litigation centers on merchant restraints imposed by pay-
ment card companies in their merchant contracts. In particular, much 
 
 1.  About Us: Uncover Diner Club’s Rich History, DINERS CLUB INT’L, 
https://www.dinersclub.com/about-us/history (last visited April 10, 2019). 
 2.  Id.  
 3.  Jamie Gonzalez-Garcia & Allie Johnson, Credit Card Ownership Statistics, 
CREDITCARDS.COM (Jan.15, 2020), https://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/ownership-
statistics.php.  
 4.  Art Swift & Steve Ander, Most Americans Foresee Death of Cash in Their Lifetime, 
GALLUP (July 15, 2016), https://news.gallup.com/poll/193706/americans-foresee-death-cash-
lifetime.aspx. 
 5.  Renata B. Hesse & Joshua H. Soven, Defining Relevant Product Markets in Elec-
tronic Payment Network Antitrust Cases, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 709 (2006). 
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of today’s litigation focuses on whether payment card companies are 
engaging in anticompetitive behavior when they prevent merchants 
from incentivizing the use of a particular credit card at the point of 
sale through contractual restraints. The Supreme Court, in Ohio v. 
American Express, analyzed Amex’s non-discrimination contractual 
provisions, which prohibit merchants from “steering” cardholders 
toward using a payment card with lower transaction fees. The Court 
held that the plaintiffs failed to show that this particular type of re-
straint resulted in anticompetitive harm within the broad, two-sided 
market definition that they adopted.6 Thus, they were not able to suf-
ficiently prove that anti-steering provisions violate antitrust law.7 
However, Amex’s merchant restraints are anticompetitive and 
cause harm to competition because they raise merchant fees and, sub-
sequently, consumer prices to a supracompetitive level. Consequent-
ly, the Court incorrectly determined that the merchant restraints im-
posed in Amex’s merchant contract agreements did not violate the 
Sherman Act. Amex’s anti-steering provisions violate antitrust law 
whether the relevant market adopted by the Court includes both 
sides of the two-sided payment card network or limits the market 
definition to include only the affected side of the payment network. 
ffK==bub`rqfsb=prjj^ov=
This paper analyzes the recent Supreme Court holding in Ohio v. 
American Express and discusses the economic implications of the 
two-sided market definition adopted by the majority In order to bet-
ter understand the novel difficulties faced by the Court in American 
Express, this paper will first briefly discuss the judicial history leading 
up to Ohio v. American Express, and the Supreme Court’s analysis of 
that history. Second, since the market definition played an outsized 
role in American Express and was hotly disputed by the justices, this 
paper discusses why the two-sided market definition is the correct 
market definition for these types of market restraints. A focus on the 
economic rationalization for the two-sided market definition is em-
phasized. Third, this paper explores the current card payment net-
work and its functionality. Since card payment networks are the main 
focus in American Express, an understanding of how they function is 
 
 6.  Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2287 (2018). 
 7.  See infra Section VI.A. 
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crucial to an understanding of the Court’s decision. Finally, this pa-
per examines the Court’s holding that Amex’s anti-steering provi-
sions were not anticompetitive. Specifically, it argues that even under 
the majority’s market definition, anti-steering provisions are anti-
competitive, and the Court should have held that “step one in the 
rule of reason analysis” was satisfied. 
fffK==lefl=sK=^jbof`^k=bumobpp=
In 2010, the United States government and seventeen states sued 
Visa, Mastercard, and Amex in federal district court, alleging that the 
defendant’s contractual non-discrimination provisions “unreasonably 
restrain[ed] trade in violation of § 1” of the Sherman Act.8 Specifical-
ly at issue were the anti-steering provisions implemented in their 
merchant use contracts. By 2011, Visa and Mastercard had voluntari-
ly agreed to rescind their anti-steering provisions and entered into 
consent judgments, leaving Amex as the sole defendant.9 The district 
court, after a seven-week bench trial, held that Amex’s anti-steering 
provisions violated § 1 of the Sherman Act in that they unreasonably 
restrained trade.10 The court determined the relevant market should 
be narrowly defined to only include network services between card 
companies and merchants. The court further held that Amex pos-
sessed sufficient market power to harm competition, and that anti-
steering provisions had actual anticompetitive effects because they 
eliminate the incentive for card companies not to charge su-
pracompetitive transaction fees.11 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re-
versed the district court’s decision. They determined the lower court 
erred by not including cardholders, the other side of the two-sided 
payment network, when defining the relevant market.12 The Second 
Circuit held that when both sides are included in one market, the net 
effects of Amex’s merchant restraints were not anticompetitive. The 
Second Circuit held that the district court had discounted the inter-
 
 8.  United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 192 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. 
Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id.  
 11.  Id. at 192-93. 
 12.  Id. 
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ests of cardholders, improperly focusing solely on merchant harm.13 
Despite the harm suffered by merchants because of these restraints, 
the court ruled that the benefits cardholders receive due to the anti-
steering provisions create a net effect in the market such that the 
non-discrimination provisions were not unreasonable restraints of 
trade.14 
The United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, affirmed 
the Second Circuit Court’s decision, holding that both sides of a two-
sided platform should be included in the market definition.15 The 
Court further held the plaintiff states did not meet their initial bur-
den of proof because they failed to show that Amex’s merchant re-
straints caused anticompetitive harm to consumers.16 
fsK==abcfkfkd=qeb=obibs^kq=j^ohbq=fk=^=qtlJpfaba=
kbqtloh=
The Supreme Court’s opinion in American Express largely focus-
es on how to properly define the relevant product market for card 
payment systems, specifically, and two-sided markets, generally. Es-
tablishing the relevant market is often the most fiercely litigated and 
most critical element in antitrust litigation.17 How courts ultimately 
define the relevant market is often the determinative factor in wheth-
er a challenged practice is deemed appropriate or anticompetitive—a 
broad relevant market definition typically benefits the defendant 
while a narrow definition typically favors the plaintiff.18 The relevant 
market is described as the “area of effective competition.”19 Accurate-
ly defining the relevant market requires combining multiple products 
into a single market when dictated by “commercial realities.”20 
 
 13.  Id. at 206. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).  
 16.  Id. at 2284. 
 17.  Patrick R. Ward, Testing for Multisided Platform Effects in Antitrust Market Defi-
nition, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2059 (2017).  
 18.  United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593, (1957). 
 19.  United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 2285 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. 
Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).; Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food 
Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965). 
 20.  Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 479, 482 (1992); 
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 
370 U.S. 294, 336 (1962). 
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A court’s arduous task of defining an appropriate relevant market 
is further complicated by the challenge of determining whether both 
groups, one group, parts of each group, or none of the interconnect-
ed groups should be included in the relevant market definition for 
two-sided networks.21 Correctly establishing what should be included 
is critical in evaluating the potential for genuine adverse effects on 
competition.22 Furthermore, innocent, profit-maximizing decisions in 
two-sided markets may be held as per se antitrust violations if a court 
incorrectly applies a one-sided market definition. Properly defining 
the relevant market in this context is absolutely crucial as courts, 
when engaging in rule of reason analysis, will weigh tradeoffs be-
tween pro- and anticompetitive effects of a certain policy within the 
court-defined relevant market.23 When defining the relevant market, 
the court establishes the zone of permissible trade-offs.24 Therefore, a 
relevant market that includes both sides of a two-sided market will be 
much broader and will necessarily include more tradeoffs for the 
court to consider than if it were to adopt a narrower definition that 
included only one side of the market.25 Whether it is appropriate to 
include both sides of the market or only one in defining the relevant 
market is where the majority and minority opinions in American Ex-
press diverge. The majority determined that commercial realities dic-
tate that the relevant market should include both merchants and 
cardholders (i.e. both sides of the payment card network).26 The 
adoption of the broader market definition led to the Court’s holding 
that American Express had not violated antitrust law. The minority 
determined that the relevant market should have been confined solely 
to the market for merchant services. This determination led to the 
opinion that American Express was guilty of violating the Sherman 
Act. Although this paper argues that the majority in American Ex-
press ultimately reached a flawed holding, the Court correctly rea-
 
 21.  Ward, supra note 17, at 2060. 
 22.  F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460 (1986). 
 23.  Ward, supra note 17, at 2059-60. 
 24.  Id.  
 25.  Allan L. Shampine, What Is at Stake with Supreme Court Review of United States 
v. American Express Co.?, 17 ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 5 (2017).  
 26.  See United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 2280 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub 
nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. 
Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 479–80 (1992). 
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soned that both sides of two-sided markets must be examined to de-
fine the relevant market and determine any possible harm. 
The unique economic characteristics inherent in a two-sided 
market dictate that an accurate market definition include both sides 
of the market.27 Two-sided markets occur when an intermediary firm 
“connect[s] two or more distinct groups of consumers that would 
benefit from interacting but face barriers to doing so.”28 This unique 
type of market has two distinct characteristics that set it apart from 
the typical one-sided market the Court commonly deals with in anti-
trust cases. First, two-sided markets consist of two distinct consumer 
groups for a firm’s product or service.29 Both groups of consumers 
are essential for the firm’s survival. Second, indirect network effects 
exist between the consumer groups such that the value one group de-
rives from the product is directly influenced by the usage level of the 
other group.30 Shopping malls provide a simplified example of the 
two main qualities that characterize a two-sided market. First, malls 
connect two distinct consumer groups by furnishing space to mer-
chants and connecting them with individuals willing to buy their 
merchandise. Neither group can survive in the market without the 
other. Second, the benefit to merchants of renting a space for their 
store will directly depend on how many people visit the mall each 
day. Additionally, the number of individuals visiting a certain mall on 
any specific day will directly depend on the number and quality of 
stores located within the mall. Thus, strong indirect network effects 
exist since the value that merchants derive from the mall is directly 
influenced by the level of usage of the individual consumers and vice-
versa. 
Amex (and all payment card networks) is the epitome of a two-
sided market. Payment card networks connect merchants, who desire 
an easy and risk-free way of accepting payments and extending credit, 
with cardholders looking for a more convenient way to pay. Both 
merchants and cardholders derive more benefit the more they utilize 
 
 27.  David S. Evans & Michael Noel, Defining Antitrust Markets When Firms Operate 
Two-Sided Platforms, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 667, 672 (2005).  
 28.  Ward, supra note 17, at 2059–60. 
 29.  Note that the term two-sided market is used throughout this paper for ease of ex-
planation. While much of the economic literature limits its analysis to markets with two distinct 
consumer groups, the same principles generally apply when any “n” number of distinct con-
sumer groups are connected through an intermediary firm, “n” being greater than one. 
 30.  Hesse & Soven, supra note 5, at 714. 
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this network. This interconnectivity creates unique economic charac-
teristics that require a different economic analysis than a standard 
one-sided market. For this reason, the American Express Court was 
correct to include both sides of the market in their definition of the 
relevant market. 
A.  Differing Economics in Two-Sided Markets 
American Express required the Court to deal with a unique set of 
economic principles that don’t necessarily apply to normal one-sided 
markets. The unique characteristics of two-sided markets make them 
distinct from typical markets. Two-sided markets are still susceptible 
to typical antitrust issues such as price fixing, tying, collusion, and 
other unreasonable restraints of trade prohibited by antitrust laws.31 
However, the traditional analytical tools used by courts and econo-
mists to determine whether an antitrust violation has occurred need 
modification when examining two-sided markets, because profit-
maximizing decisions made by intermediary firms in a two-sided 
market may differ drastically from typical profit-maximizing deci-
sions in a one-sided market.32 If the standard tools of analysis are not 
modified when analyzing two-sided markets, perfectly legal, profit-
maximizing decisions may be incorrectly determined to violate anti-
trust law. This may occur even when the market is sufficiently com-
petitive and no unreasonable restraints on trade are present. Predato-
ry pricing and price fixing are two examples of the inherent economic 
differences in two-sided markets and why an accurate market defini-
tion requires both sides of the market to be included. 
1.  Predatory pricing: illegally predatory or validly efficient? 
Predatory pricing33 exemplifies the necessity to customize eco-
nomic analysis when interpreting a firm’s business decisions in a two-
 
 31.  Evans & Noel, supra note 27, at 670–71; see also 15 U.S.C.S § 1, 15. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Predatory pricing involves pricing below marginal cost in order to price out the 
competition in the market. This type of pricing scheme requires firms to have the ability to sus-
tain business at a loss long enough to price all competition out of the market. Additionally, it 
requires the ability to prevent further entry into the market. Once all competition has been 
eliminated, firms can then recoup their losses charging monopoly-level prices. See Brooke Grp. 
Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222 (1993). 
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sided market. In a typical competitive market, a firm’s profit-
maximizing decision in the long run will never be to set a product’s 
price below marginal cost (or average variable cost) for that prod-
uct.34 Even in an entry-level economic scenario35 of a perfectly com-
petitive market, a firm’s profit-maximizing decision will be to set a 
price equal to the marginal cost, and never lower. If a firm were to 
price below its marginal cost, the firm would lose money on each unit 
sold—a decision that is completely unsustainable when put into prac-
tice in an ordinary one-sided market. Therefore, when a firm in a 
typical market is pricing below its marginal cost, courts can reasona-
bly assume, without much inquiry, that the firm is engaging in preda-
tory pricing in an attempt to edge opponents out of the market and 
benefit from the ability to subsequently price at monopoly levels once 
competition has been sufficiently diminished.36 
Apart from a desire to drive out competition through this kind of 
pricing scheme, there is rarely a valid reason for a firm to price its 
goods in this way. Therefore, this type of pricing scheme has essen-
tially become a per se antitrust violation in a typical one-sided mar-
ket. Pricing at, or even below marginal cost, however, is quite com-
mon in two-sided markets as a valid form of competitive profit-
maximization.37 The more each distinct consumer group utilizes the 
two-sided market, the more valuable the market becomes to the other 
consumer group. In order to maximize this relationship, intermediary 
firms may price in a way that caters to the consumer group with more 
elastic price elasticity38 of demand.39 Often, in order to attract suffi-
cient participation in a two-sided market, firms will offer a severely 
 
 34.  Marginal cost is simply the cost of production to produce one additional unit. 
 35.  This type of scenario is hardly applicable to the “real world.” These scenarios typi-
cally dictate that transaction costs are excluded, goods are completely homogenous, and other 
assumptions that make this type of scenario implausible in the real world.  
 36.  Monopoly pricing is pricing at a level such that profit is maximized. The ability to 
price at this level is the only way for firms to recoup the losses they incurred while attempting 
to price the other firms out of the market.  
 37.  Evans & Noel, supra note 27, at 670–72. 
 38.  Elasticity of demand defines how responsive demand is to a change in price. The 
more elastic the demand, the more demand will change in response to changes in price. See 
United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 400 (1956); Robert Pitofsky, 
New Definitions of Relevant market and the Assault on Antitrust, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1805, 
1814 (1990). 
 39.  David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Plat-
form Businesses, 1 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INT’L ANTITRUST ECONS. 404, 409 (eds. R. 
Blair and D. Sokol, 2014). 
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discounted price to the “harder-to-attract” group on one side at the 
expense of the more robust, “ready-and-willing” group on the other 
side.40 In some cases, firms may even find it profitable to offer a 
group with a very elastic demand curve a price at, or even below, its 
marginal cost.41 This is illustrated by shopping malls allowing cus-
tomers to enter the mall at no charge and by payment card companies 
offering rewards,42 such as airline miles and cash-back awards, to 
their cardholders simply for using their card to purchase items.43 
These costs are shifted to the more robust consumer groups, such as 
shop owners renting a storefront or merchants utilizing the card 
payment system.44 If these markets were analyzed utilizing the tradi-
tional tools courts use when looking at a typical market, courts would 
almost certainly arrive at the fundamentally incorrect conclusion that 
intermediary firms engaging in this type of pricing scheme within a 
two-sided market were guilty of predatory pricing. 
2.  Price fixing: violating antitrust laws has never been so hard 
Price fixing is another example of an antitrust violation that 
should be viewed with skepticism and analyzed differently when pre-
sented in the context of a two-sided market. This is not to say that 
courts should treat one-sided and two-sided markets differently when 
there is ample evidence of naked price fixing. When there is clear ev-
idence of per se price fixing, market definition is irrelevant. However, 
when allegations of price fixing are made without clear evidence such 
that rule of reason45 analysis is required, the court must include both 
sides of a two-sided network when defining the relevant market. The 
already difficult task of illegally setting a supracompetitive price in a 
 
 40.  Ward, supra note 17, at 2059–60. 
 41.  Benjamin Klein, Andres V. Lerner, Kevin M. Murphy & Lacey L. Plache, Competi-
tion in Two-Sided Markets: The Antitrust Economics of Payment Card Interchange Fees, 73 
ANTITRUST L.J. 571, 585 (2006).  
 42.  Not only are credit card rewards an example of consumers receiving a price below a 
firm’s marginal cost, credit card rewards are also one of the scarce examples where consumers 
may actually receive a negative price (a firm actually pays consumers to use their product). 
 43.  Credit card rewards and negative pricing will be thoroughly treated in the subse-
quent section. 
 44.  Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant market and the Assault on Antitrust, 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1805, 1814 (1990). 
 45.  See infra, Section VI.A. 
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typical one-sided competitive market46 is made much harder in a two-
sided market.47 Similar to firms in one-sided markets, firms in two-
sided markets can still collude to set supracompetitive prices. Howev-
er, the inherent difficulties48 faced by colluding, price-fixing firms in 
one-sided markets are exacerbated in two-sided markets, making 
price fixing much more difficult.49 
In a competitive, two-sided market, colluding firms must be able 
to set prices for both consumer groups to effectively increase profits 
through price fixing.50 Otherwise, firms would only be shifting profits 
from the fixed-price consumer group to the group whose prices ha-
ven’t been set.51 This problem is even further exacerbated when mar-
kets consist of more than two consumer groups, as colluding firms 
must have the ability to fix prices for every consumer group in the 
market in order to effectively raise profits through price fixing.52 
Further, even if firms have the ability to set prices for each con-
sumer group in the market, the inherent indirect network effects53 ex-
isting between the consumer groups are likely to make price fixing an 
unsuitable business practice.54 Typically, firms in one-sided markets 
choose to fix prices because they are able to increase their profits by 
charging a higher price. Generally, the supracompetitive price over-
comes the loss in quantity sold when marginal consumers refuse to 
buy the product at the higher price. However, firms in two-sided 
markets are not ordinarily faced with such an easy decision. Network 
effects that exist between the consumer groups can turn a small, ini-
tial decrease in demand by one consumer group into a catastrophic 
feedback loop that results in substantially decreased demand by both 
 
 46.  See id. 
 47.  Evans & Noel, supra note 27, at 670–73. 
 48.  Typical problems for colluding, price-fixing firms include cheating, effectively di-
viding markets, managing relevant substitutes, division of profits, and enforcement. Even in 
one-sided markets, these problems regularly lead to the eventual dissolution of cartels setting 
supracompetitive prices. See Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Breaking Up is 
Hard to Do: Determinants of Cartel Duration, 54 J.L & ECON 455 (2011). 
 49.  These problems are even further exacerbated when markets consist of more than 
two consumer groups. 
 50.  Klein, supra note 41, at 577. 
 51.  Ward, supra note 17, at 2061. 
 52.  Hesse & Soven, supra note 5, at 715. 
 53.  See Ward, supra note 17.  
 54.  Id. at 2061. 
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groups.55 For example, if consumer group A’s demand falls, consumer 
group B’s demand will correspondingly fall regardless of whether its 
price is raised or not since part of the value that group B receives 
from the product derives from consumer group A’s use of the prod-
uct.56 Additionally, if group B’s demand falls, group A’s demand will 
fall even further than it initially fell when its price was raised, since 
group A also derives some of its value from group B’s use.57 This will 
then affect group B’s demand, which will, in turn, affect group A’s 
demand, and so on and so forth. Therefore, a single price increase to 
one group can result in a substantial decrease in use by both groups. 
This indirect network effect makes it very difficult for firms in two-
sided markets to profitably fix supracompetitive prices. Slight, initial 
changes in demand can cascade into a detrimentally lower output 
which even the most supracompetitive price cannot compensate for.58 
Thus, price fixing allegations in the context of two-sided markets 
should be viewed much more skeptically than their one-sided coun-
terparts. The constraints imposed by the market, rather than antitrust 
law, will typically be sufficient to discourage anticompetitive behav-
ior. This places added pressure on courts to properly define relevant 
markets. Improperly determining that only one side of a two-sided 
market should be considered in the market definition may lead to 
fundamentally incorrect court decisions. 
The inherent difficulty for firms to profitably engage in price fix-
ing in a two-sided market inevitably makes price-fixing violations 
quite rare when compared with violations occurring in one-sided 
markets. Therefore, courts should approach price fixing allegations 
differently when analyzing two-sided markets. A court’s economic 
analysis drastically changes in the context of a two-sided market. 
From predatory pricing to price fixing to a myriad of other antitrust 
violations, a court must adapt its analytical tools in order to correctly 
determine the extent to which firms have engaged in illegal activity. 
Both sides of the two-sided market must be included in the definition 
of the relevant market. The court’s rule of reason analysis will only 
be correct if the market is correctly defined.59 
 
 55.  Klein, supra note 41, at 577. 
 56.  Hesse & Soven, supra note 5, at 715. 
 57.  Evans & Noel, supra note 27, at 680. 
 58.  See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 400–03 (1956). 
 59.  Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978). 
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Payment card networks are one of the largest and most discussed 
two-sided networks in existence today.60 In order to fully understand 
how the merchant restraints imposed by Amex affected competition 
in the market, an understanding of payment card networks is im-
portant. In addition to being perhaps the most widely discussed two-
sided markets in economic literature, payment card networks affect 
more people than any other two-sided market. These networks and 
the two-sided network analysis that accompanies them plagued the 
Supreme Court in American Express. While the Court was not new 
to analyzing payment card networks and two-sided markets, general-
ly, American Express was its first opportunity to explicitly define how 
the rule of reason should be applied in the context of a two-sided 
network.61 In order to properly understand the Supreme Court’s rul-
ing, an understanding of the payment network structure, its rewards 
programs, and merchant restraints is essential. 
A.  The Network Structure 
The world is becoming paperless. The simplicity of payment 
cards, coupled with the ever-increasing popularity of online shop-
ping, has resulted in payment networks becoming more prolific than 
ever. As stated earlier, the majority of Americans believe the United 
States will become a cashless society within their lifetime.62 Current-
ly, only 12% of Americans still prefer paying with cash over a card.63 
All payment networks handle transactions in a similar manner. A con-
sumer presents his or her card in order to pay for a transaction. The 
merchant sends the card information to its payment processor who 
forwards the card information to the bank issuing the card.64 The is-
suing bank will then decide whether to approve or deny the charge.65 
 
 60.  Klein, supra note 41, at 585. 
 61.  See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 145 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), 
rev’d and remanded, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 
S. Ct. 2274 (2018).  
 62.  Gonzalez-Garcia & Johnson, supra note 3.   
 63.  Swift & Ander, supra note 4.  
 64.  Lindsay Konsko, What Makes Discover and American Express Different From Visa 
and Mastercard, (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/credit-cards/discover-
amex-issue-process-own-cards/. 
 65.  Id. 
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Some cards, such as Visa and Mastercard, act simply as payment pro-
cessors linking merchants with banks that issue their cards, who then 
approve or deny the charge.66 Other cards, such as Amex and Discov-
er, act as both the payment processors and the issuing bank.67 Acting 
as both the lender and the processor allows payment card networks, 
like Amex and Discover, more freedom than other card companies 
when it comes to setting merchant fees. 
This process is substantially paid-for through the charging of 
merchant fees. When a payment is processed, the issuing bank charg-
es the cardholder’s account for the full amount of the transaction and 
then sends the payment to the merchant minus the interchange fees. 
For a small transaction fee, merchants can extend credit to customers 
without undertaking any financial risk. Consequently, many mer-
chants are happy to pay a small transaction fee in order to facilitate 
the transaction and receive immediate payment. Moreover, part of 
the cost of the merchant fees is passed on to the consumer in the 
form of higher-priced goods. These fees are typically set at a level 
such that merchants are willing to accept the card at their stores, and 
issuing banks have the incentive to cover the risk inherent in issuing 
payment cards.68 
B.  Competition in Payment Card Networks 
Credit card companies must compete vigorously for customers. 
With regard to the efficiency of use, credit cards are one of the most 
homogenous products in any competitive market. No one card is sig-
nificantly easier to use or more secure than any other payment card. 
Therefore, credit card companies can distinguish and market them-
selves to consumers in two ways: merchant acceptance and rewards 
programs. Some card companies then place restraints on merchants 
in order to preserve the effect these methods have of increasing de-
mand for their card. 
 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Understand Interchange, MASTERCARD, https://www.mastercard.us/en-us/about-
mastercard/what-we-do/interchange.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2019). 
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1.  Merchant acceptance 
As discussed above, indirect network effects exist in any two-sided 
market, including payment card networks.69 For example, the more 
merchants that accept a certain payment card, the more valuable that 
card will be to cardholders. This means that card companies cannot 
charge merchants any fee they desire because their card may not be 
widely accepted by merchants, which would exponentially decrease 
the value of the entire card network. Consequently, card companies 
are somewhat restricted in the fees they can charge merchants. This 
is evidenced in the fact that Amex, which notoriously charges higher 
merchant fees than other card networks, significantly lags behind the 
other major cards in regard to merchant acceptance.70 
Despite only being accepted by close to half of the merchants 
which accept Visa or Mastercard, American Express remains a profit-
able firm.71 While it is important for card companies to be mindful of 
the merchant fee that they charge, merchant acceptance is not always 
the most effective way to successfully compete in the market. Card-
holders have a significantly more elastic demand than merchants. 
Therefore, successfully soliciting consumers to utilize one card over 
the other will have a significantly greater impact on the network than 
merely promoting merchant acceptance. 
2. Reward programs: What’s in your wallet? 
Adequate merchant participation is crucial for any firm hoping to 
survive in a payment card network. Ensuring robust consumer partic-
ipation in the network is absolutely essential for a card company to be 
profitable in a payment card network. Since consumers have much 
more elastic demand for card payment services than merchants, firms 
typically focus their efforts on acquiring as many cardholders as pos-
sible.72 One of the most effective ways of promoting consumer partic-
ipation is through reward programs. Reward programs used by dif-
 
 69.  Hesse & Soven, supra note 5, at 714. 
 70.  Konsko, supra note 64. 
 71.  See Joe Resendiz, Where and How Widely are Visa, Mastercard, Discover and 
American Express Credit Cards Accepted?, VALUE PENGUIN, 
https://www.valuepenguin.com/where-visa-mastercard-american-express-discover-accepted 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2019). 
 72.  See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2281-82 (2018). 
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ferent card companies range from airline miles to actual cash back 
when used for certain purchases.73 When firms offer rewards pro-
grams for cards that are already free to use, they are selling their card 
services to cardholders for a negative price. In order for this seeming-
ly paradoxical economic decision of setting a negative price for a 
good to be profitable, firms must recoup their losses by charging the 
group on the other side of the market a seemingly supracompetitive 
price. A major part of merchant fees collected by most card compa-
nies74 is used to fund the rewards programs they offer their cardhold-
ers.75 This is especially true for Amex, which typically offers its card-
holders greater rewards than the other card companies.76 Merchants 
receive no benefit from these rewards programs even though they are 
the ones financing them through the fees they pay to the credit card 
companies.77 In fact, accepting cards with high fees arguably hurts 
merchants, as they must charge a higher price for their goods than 
they otherwise would without the merchant fees. Further, merchants 
see no increase in sales from rewards programs, as consumers typical-
ly just shift their purchases to the card with the greatest rewards pro-
grams—usually the card with the highest merchant fees.78 
3.  Merchant restraints 
Merchant restraints are contractual rules imposed on merchants 
as terms of use for payment card services. In American Express, mul-
tiple states challenged the legality of merchant restraints. They ques-
tioned whether the contractual restraints imposed on merchants in 
regard to their card acceptance policies violated antitrust law because 
the restraints precluded merchants from endorsing one card over an-
other. Specifically, merchants were required to agree to a “non-
 
 73.  Explore Your Rewards, AMERICAN EXPRESS, https://www.americanexpress.com/ 
us/rewards/membership-rewards/usepoints/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2019). 
 74.  Some cards, such as Visa and Mastercard, fund a portion of their rewards programs 
through interest rates in addition to merchant fees. American Express, however, operates dif-
ferently. The majority of its elite cards are charge cards that must be settled at the end of the 
month. Therefore, it cannot rely on interest rates to fund these rewards programs and must 
almost exclusively use merchant fees to fund the programs.  
 75.  Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The Economic Costs of Credit Card Merchant Re-
straints, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1321, 1325 (2008). 
 76.  Resendiz, supra note 71. 
 77.  Levitin, supra note 75. 
 78.  Id.  
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discrimination provision” which prohibited them from directly or in-
directly steering consumers toward a card with a lower transaction 
fee at the point of sale. These provisions were placed into merchant 
contracts by card companies to ensure that their card usage did not 
decrease in response to a higher merchant fee. Since most merchants 
accept multiple cards, card companies depend on these restrictions to 
ensure that their cards are treated equally by each merchant, even 
though their fees to the merchant are higher than other cards accept-
ed by the merchant.79 
The district court was quick to point out that, at the very least, 
steering is pro-competitive and used by merchants in many different 
contexts.80 Merchants place certain goods at eye-level in their stores, 
offer “buy-one-get-one-free” discounts for select products, and use 
many other marketing tools to steer customers to a certain product.81 
However, the pro-competitive nature of this activity is markedly ab-
sent in the credit card market. In a perfectly competitive market with 
no restraints, a merchant could simply steer consumers towards the 
card with the lowest merchant fee and offer the consumers a discount 
on the current transactions at the point of sale. Since the vast majori-
ty of consumers carry more than one brand of credit card,82 consum-
ers could then decide if they wanted a 2% discount on the current 
transaction in lieu of a later reward of airline miles. Contractual pro-
visions of this sort not only prevent merchants from competitively in-
centivizing consumers to use a lower-fee card, but also prevent card-
holders from making the most efficient personal decision. As will be 
discussed below, these types of merchant restraints preclude mer-
chants from rectifying the market imbalance created by unusually 
high fees. Further, merchant restraints require merchants to treat 
credit card transaction fees as general overhead costs and spread the 
transaction costs of their accepted cards across all card holders. 
Therefore, consumers who typically use cards with lower transaction 
fees, such as Discover, subsidize the benefits enjoyed by card holders 
using cards with higher transaction fees, such as Amex. Generally, 
 
 79.  United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 151–52 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), 
rev’d and remanded, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 
S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
 80.  Id. at 150. 
 81.  Id.  
 82.  Gonzalez-Garcia & Johnson, supra note 3. 
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this means that poorer cardholders actually subsidize wealthier card 
holder’s rewards programs, as cards with higher transaction fees (and 
corresponding rewards programs) are typically held by wealthier in-
dividuals.83 Whether merchants actually have the ability to effectively 
unbundle their general transaction costs and charge each cardholder 
differently depending on his or her preferred card was determined 
not to have been effectively shown in American Express. As will be 
argued below, if the states in American Express could have effectively 
proven merchants’ ability to price according to a cardholder’s pur-
chasing decisions at the point of sale, the Court would have likely 
found step one in the rule of reason analysis to be satisfied. The poor 
subsidizing the rich due to competitive restraints is exactly what the 
Sherman Act was implemented to prevent. Consumer protection is 
sacrosanct to antitrust law, and contractual provisions promoting 
consumer harm merely to benefit a more elite class of consumers may 
not even require a rule of reason analysis. Merchant restraints that 
prohibit price competition without a countervailing procompetitive 
effect cannot withstand antitrust scrutiny. 
sfK==^kqf`ljmbqfqfsb=bccb`qp=
The other intensely contested issue in American Express, aside 
from determining the definition of the market, was the extent of the 
anticompetitive effects of American Express’s merchant restraints. 
The majority incorrectly held that Amex’s anti-steering provisions 
did not violate antitrust law. Specifically, the Court incorrectly de-
termined that the plaintiff states failed to carry their burden of show-
ing that the challenged conditions had anticompetitive effects.84 
The first section of the Sherman Act prohibits unreasonable re-
straints of trade.85 Anticompetitive harm can be attributed to hori-
zontal and vertical restraints.86 Horizontal restraints are agreements 
 
 83.  Aaron Klein, Why the Supreme Court Decision in Ohio v. Amex Will Fatten the 
Wealthy’s Wallet (At the Expense of the Middle Class), BROOKINGS (June 25, 2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/ohio-v-amex/. 
 84.  See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2287 (2018). 
 85.  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018); Note that the text of § 1 actually prohibits all restraints of 
trade. Subsequent case law has since amended the Act to prohibit only unreasonable restraints 
of trade. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98 
(1984); Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982). 
 86.  Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007). 
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between competitors in a market to impose certain restraints.87 Verti-
cal restraints are agreements between firms at different levels of dis-
tribution to impose certain restraints.88 Both parties in American Ex-
press conceded that Amex’s anti-steering provisions were vertical 
restraints.89 Typically, vertical restraints are scrutinized utilizing rule 
of reason analysis.90 Both parties agreed that rule of reason analysis 
was appropriate to determine if Amex’s vertical restraints constituted 
unreasonable restraints of trade.91 
A.  Rule of Reason Review 
When reviewing an alleged antitrust violation, the court either 
(1) determines that the practice or restraint is per se unreasonable or 
(2) engages in a rule of reason analysis to decide if the law has been 
violated. Restraints that are per se unreasonable are “certain agree-
ments or practices which because of their pernicious effect on com-
petition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed 
to be unreasonable.”92 By applying this test, the court can find that a 
particular practice unreasonably restrains trade without having to 
delve into the complex economic analysis of defining the relevant 
product market or determining concentration of market power—the 
two elements most commonly disputed in antitrust litigation.93 Suffi-
cient experience with particular types of restraints enables the court 
to apply this simplified technique of decision-making and determine 
that certain restraints carry a conclusive presumption of unreasona-
bleness.94 Examples of these well-established restraints of trade that 
the court has held to be per se unreasonable are price fixing,95 tying 
arrangements,96 explicit division of markets,97 and group boycotts.98 
When presented with these restraints of trade that are decidedly anti-
 
 87.  Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 730 (1988). 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2284. 
 90.  Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 551 U.S. at 882. 
 91.  Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2284. 
 92.  N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
 93.  Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979). 
 94.  Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982). 
 95.  United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 210 (1940). 
 96.  Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). 
 97.  Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
 98.  Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 668 (1941). 
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competitive, the court can determine that the Sherman Act has been 
violated without defining a relevant market. Therefore, when suffi-
cient evidence is present to show that these specific restraints oc-
curred, one-sided and two-sided markets are treated the same, and 
the courts do not need to delve into the specialized economics re-
quired of each type of market. 
When challenged restraints are not so obviously unreasonable as 
to allow the court to pass judgment without engaging in an in-depth 
review of market conditions, rule of reason analysis is used to deter-
mine the competitive effect of the restraint in question.99 Both the 
majority and dissenting opinions in American Express agreed rule of 
reason was the proper approach to evaluate Amex’s challenged re-
straints. Unlike per se analysis, the rule of reason requires an inquiry 
into the relevant product market and the concentration of market 
power within that market.100 As discussed in Section IV, the scope of 
the relevant market, defined by the Court, significantly impacts 
whether challenged conditions pass scrutiny when analyzed using the 
rule of reason.101 The majority in American Express determined that 
Amex’s anti-steering provisions were not anticompetitive when both 
consumers and merchants in the card payment network were com-
bined into a single market.102 However, even with the broad, two-
sided market definition promulgated by the majority, this paper ar-
gues that Amex’s merchant restraints are anticompetitive and should 
have been ruled illegal under the rule of reason. 
The Court requires an inquiry into a three-step burden-shifting 
analysis when analyzing a challenged restraint under the rule of rea-
son. This burden-shifting analysis, and whether the burdens were 
met, was vehemently disputed between the Justices in American Ex-
press. 
The first step in the rule of reason analysis requires the plaintiff 
to identify the challenged conduct that is supposedly anticompetitive 
and show that it causes harm to competition.103 A plaintiff can prove 
his or her prima facie case at step one in two ways. First, plaintiffs can 
 
 99.  Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). 
 100.  Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984). 
 101.  See United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 206 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub 
nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
 102.  Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2287. 
 103.  FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986). 
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directly show actual anticompetitive effects that the challenged prac-
tice has caused.104 Second, they can indirectly show that anticompeti-
tive effects exist by illustrating that the defendant has market power 
in the defined market and that there is plausible harm to competi-
tion.105 Once a prima facie case of competitive harm is shown the 
burden then shifts to the defendants who have the opportunity to 
prove countervailing pro-competitive effects that arise out of the 
challenged conduct.106 If pro-competitive effects are shown, the bur-
den shifts back to the plaintiffs to either rebut the evidence of pro-
competitive effects shown by the defendant or show that there are 
less restrictive alternatives that the defendant can employ to achieve 
the same pro-competitive results.107 
1.  Step one 
In American Express, the Court should have determined that the 
plaintiff states carried their burden of presenting a prima facie case in 
step one of the rule of reason analysis. Even accepting the broad, 
two-sided market definition described by the majority, there is suffi-
cient evidence to show that Amex’s anti-steering provisions cause ac-
tual competitive harm. To sufficiently satisfy the burden required by 
step one, it must be demonstrated that Amex’s anti-steering provi-
sions had anticompetitive effects on the two-sided market as a 
whole.108 In other words, plaintiff states had to establish that the mer-
chant restraints had a net anticompetitive effect resulting in harm to 
competition considering the effect of the restraint on both merchants 
and cardholders.109 Proof of this harm can be shown either through 
direct or indirect evidence.110 Amex’s anti-steering provisions violate 
Section one of the Sherman Act for two reasons. First, anti-steering 
provisions allow Amex to charge a supracompetitive merchant trans-
action fee. The cost of this fee is then passed on to cardholders in the 
form of higher-priced goods. Second, allowing card companies to in-
 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. at 460. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2274 (2018). 
 109.  Id.  
 110.  Id. at 2284; FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460. 
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clude anti-steering provisions in their merchant contracts drastically 
decreases incentives to charge a competitive transaction fee. 
Evidence that Amex’s anti-steering provisions resulted in su-
pracompetitive merchant transaction fees is sufficient to satisfy the 
required burden in step one of the court’s rule of reason analysis. 
This remains true whether the majority’s or the dissent’s market def-
inition is adopted. The district court record provided direct evidence 
that transaction fees exceeded the competitive level when subjected 
to anti-steering contractual provisions.111 However, Justice Thomas, 
speaking for the majority, stated that he was “unconvinced” that 
Amex’s anti-steering provisions resulted in anticompetitive harm to 
the market as a whole.112 The Court cited as evidence that the district 
court failed to include cardholders in their market definition.113 The 
majority wrongly assumed that when cardholders are included in the 
relevant market, the net effect of anti-steering provisions is not anti-
competitive.114 Including cardholders in the relevant market, howev-
er, exacerbates the anticompetitive effect of Amex’s contractual re-
straints. 
The district court provided direct evidence that merchants pass 
the cost of higher transaction fees on to cardholders in the form of 
higher retail prices.115 Therefore, cardholders pay for their own re-
wards programs in the form of higher-priced goods. This would not 
be an issue if Amex rewarded its cardholders equal to, or more than, 
the increase in retail prices. However, evidence shows that Amex’s in-
creases in merchant fees were not entirely spent on rewards for card-
holders.116 Additionally, almost one-third of cardholders never even 
redeem the rewards they accrue through purchases.117 Therefore, at 
least a portion of the increased retail prices, caused by anti-steering 
provisions, are borne by Amex cardholders with no offsetting reward. 
 
 111.  United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 197-215 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), 
rev’d and remanded, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 
S. Ct. 2274 (2018).  
 112.  Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2287. 
 113.  Id. at 2289. 
 114.  Id. at 2287. 
 115.  Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 195. 
 116.  Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2278; Shampine, supra note 25, at 4–5. 
 117.  3 in 10 Have Never Redeemed Credit Card Rewards, BANKRATE (Apr. 12, 2017),  
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/3-in-10-have-never-redeemed-credit-card-
rewards-300438538.html. 
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The fact that Amex’s provisions create a net burden on cardhold-
ers is not the only economic harm caused by the restraints. Amex’s 
contractual provisions also prevent cardholders from making utility-
maximizing decisions at the point of sale as well.118 Therefore, even if 
Amex sufficiently offset the burden of higher retail prices with its re-
wards programs, the merchant restraints would still have an anticom-
petitive effect on the market as a whole. 
Anti-steering agreements preclude cardholders from making a 
utility-based purchasing decision at the point of sale. For example, a 
cardholder may prefer an immediate 2% discount offered by a mer-
chant for using a different credit card rather than the airline reward 
miles he would receive from making the purchase. This may be true 
even if the airline miles technically have a higher cash value than the 
immediate 2% discount offered by a merchant. Anti-steering provi-
sions not only prevent merchants from rectifying a market imbalance 
by offering incentives to use cards with lower fees, but also preclude 
cardholders from making the most efficient choice at the point of 
sale. Thus, anti-steering provisions reduce utility throughout the 
market for both merchants and cardholders. Evidence of increased 
prices, in addition to decreased market utility, is sufficient to show a 
prima facie case of competitive harm in the market.119 
Further, not every consumer subjected to higher retail prices 
caused by Amex’s anti-steering provisions is an Amex cardholder. As 
discussed above, anti-steering provisions require merchants to treat 
supracompetitive transaction fees as general overhead.120 Merchants 
then distribute the additional costs from abnormally high transaction 
fees over all consumers not just Amex cardholders.121 Therefore, con-
sumers who do not regularly use an Amex credit card for purchases 
actually subsidize the rewards programs Amex cardholders enjoy. 
These consumers pay higher retail prices with no offsetting Amex 
reward whatsoever. Given that Amex cards are typically reserved for 
wealthier individuals, elite members of society are generally those 
 
 118.  Shampine, supra note 25, at 4–5. 
 119.  Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2284; FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 
460 (1986). 
 120.  United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 195 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d 
and remanded, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 
2274 (2018).  
 121.  Id. 
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who benefit from this type of system.122 The lower class subsidizes 
these benefits, as its members typically use low-transaction fee meth-
ods of payment that do not generate rewards from frequency of use, 
such as cash or debit cards.123 The anti-steering contractual provi-
sions in American Express facilitate consumer harm in order to bene-
fit an elite class of consumers at the expense of the poor. This Robin-
Hood-in-reverse system causes significant harm to competition in the 
form of supracompetitive prices. Given the significant harm to con-
sumers caused by these restraints, the Court should have ruled that 
step one in the rule of reason analysis was satisfied. 
B.  Anti-Steering Provisions Drastically Decrease Incentives to 
Charge Competitive Transaction Fees 
In addition to creating supracompetitive retail prices, anti-
steering provisions significantly reduce the incentives for card com-
panies to charge a competitive merchant transaction fee.124 Amex’s 
anti-steering merchant restraints preclude competition among card 
companies at the point of sale. This eliminates significant incentives 
for card companies to keep their merchant transaction fees low, since 
merchants are not allowed to offer alternatives that could economi-
cally benefit their customers. Thus, consumers are precluded from 
making competitive choices based on lower transaction fees at the 
point of sale.125 Removing this level of competition creates higher 
transaction fees. Justice Breyer, in his dissent, effectively character-




 122.  Klein, supra note 83. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  See United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 192-93 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub 
nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
 125.  Shampine, supra note 25, at 5. 
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If American Express’ merchant fees are so high that merchants suc-
cessfully induce their customers to use other cards, American Ex-
press can remedy that problem by lowering those fees or by spend-
ing more on cardholder rewards so that cardholders decline such 
requests. What it may not do is demand contractual protection 
from price competition.126 
 
While competition for merchant acceptance does somewhat re-
strain what card companies can charge merchants for their services, 
supracompetitive transaction fees still prevail when competition is re-
stricted by merchant restraints.127 
Allowing these restraints to persist strengthens the already signif-
icant barriers to entry that prospective card companies must over-
come in order to enter the transaction market. Higher barriers to en-
try for new competition further eliminate the incentives of operating 
card companies to charge competitive transaction fees.128 New card 
companies wishing to enter the market cannot compete by instituting 
a market model that promotes lower transaction fees in order to ac-
quire more merchant acceptance. Without anti-steering provisions, 
firms wishing to enter the market may be able to acquire market 
share by lowering transaction fees. Consumers, made aware of the 
economic benefit they will receive in terms of a lower retail price at 
the point of sale, will likely choose to use the card that most benefits 
them.129 However, anti-steering provisions prevent card companies 
from competing at the point of sale. While lowering transaction fees 
may help new card companies compete in terms of merchant ac-
ceptance and consequently, more potential cardholders, merchants 
are prevented from offering incentives to their customers who use 
cards with lower transaction fees since there is no incentive for con-
sumers to use their new card over any other one in the highly con-
centrated market.130 These anticompetitive practices are obstacles 
that many prospective firms cannot overcome when seeking to enter 
the market. Promoting higher barriers to entry in this way will pre-
 
 126.  Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2294 (2018). 
 127.  See Shampine, supra note 25, at 6.  
 128.  Chi. Bridge & Iron Co. N.V. v. FTC, 534 F.3d 410, 428 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 129.  See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 151-52 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), 
rev’d and remanded, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 
S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
 130.  Id. 
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vent sufficient entry from counteracting supracompetitive prices in 
the market.131 This is especially likely given that the market for credit 
card transactions is already extremely concentrated. 
Anti-steering provisions have anticompetitive effects on the credit 
card transaction market. This is true regardless of whether a two-
sided or one-sided market definition is adopted. The substantial 
competitive harm created by these provisions is evidenced by su-
pracompetitive merchant and consumer prices. For this reason, step 
one in the rule of reason analysis is satisfied. Although the Court did 
not address steps two and three it is likely they too are satisfied. Even 
if Amex could sufficiently show a pro-competitive effect that arises 
out of these restraints, many less-restrictive alternatives exist that 
could have been used to produce the same result. 
sffK==`lk`irpflk=
The Court in American Express was correct in adopting the two-
sided market definition. This definition is the most economically 
sound and encompasses the reality of the market. However, the 
Court incorrectly determined that Amex’s anti-steering provisions 
did not violate antitrust law. Even using the broad, two-sided market 
definition, anti-steering provisions have anticompetitive effects on 
the market as a whole because they increase merchant fees and retail 
prices while decreasing incentives for card companies to compete. 
The Court erred in holding that step one in the rule of reason analy-
sis was not satisfied. Amex’s anti-steering contractual provisions cause 
harm to competition by raising retail prices, eliminating consumers’ 
utility-maximizing decisions at the point of sale, and decreasing in-
centives to charge a competitive merchant transaction fee. Therefore, 
Amex’s anti-steering provisions unreasonably restrain trade in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act. 
 
 
 131.  Chi. Bridge & Iron Co. N.V., 534 F.3d at 428. 
